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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, *
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
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TINA JACKSON and
KELLY NORTON,

Supreme Court
Case No.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 950361- CA
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Defendants/Appellants.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARTIN S. BLAUSTEIN, #3993
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
550 - 24th Street, Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Plaintiffs/Appellees
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4.

No sheriff or constable inventoried tenants' personal

property or stored it.
5.

After the January 20 order was issued, landlords refused

to release personal property and prescriptive medicine belonging to
tenants' minor children.
6.

By order of January 27, 1995, the court amended its prior

order and permitted tenants to retrieve a small portion of the
personal property belonging to their minor children.
7.

(R. 018)

a

By written notice on February 21, 1995, tenants requested

that landlords relinquish their personal property, pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-36-10.5(4)(b)(i). (R. 021)
8.

Landlords refused to release any property.

9.

On April 21, 1995, the court denied

tenants' motion for

relief from judgment ruling that " . . . the contract provisions
regarding tenants' property shall apply. . . ." (R. 024) Landlords
still hold tenants' property.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY DECLARING A CONTRACTUAL LIEN WAS
CREATED BY THE BUTTERS-JACKSON LEASE, SIGNIFICANTLY
DEPARTED FROM ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, AS THE LEASE
LANGUAGE DID NOT CREATE A CONTRACTUAL LIEN.
The Utah Court of appeals erred in finding that the ButtersJackson lease contained a contractual lien on all of the tenants'

personal property to secure payment of rent.

While correct in

citing Citizens Bank v. Elks Blda. ,N.V. , 663 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah
1983) for the proposition that parties may by contract establish a
lien to secure payment of rent, that case held that a contractual
lien agreement must: (1) "identify the property to be charged, and
(2) make clear that the lien is to secure payment of the debt in
question."

The Court then cited a number of cases as examples;

however, each of them specifically and expressly provides that a
"lien" is granted in some property. This actually formed the basis
for the holding in that case: no contractual lien existed where the
lease simply said that if the tenant was in defaultf all of their
property became the landlord's.

This language is similar to the

present case, where the landlords, with the blessing of the trial
court, have seized and held all of the tenants' property and can
presumably sell or retain it. Citizens Bank requires the opposite
result here.
Other cases have held that the language creating a lien must
state clearly an intention to do so and some have required "strict
proof" of such an intention to create a lien. See

Cherno v. Dutch

American Mercantile Corporation, 353 F.2d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1965);
Wellbro Building Company v. McConnico, 421 P.2d 837, 839 (Ok.
1966):
In order that a lien may be created by a contract,
express or implied, it is generally necessary that the
5

Utah Code § 70A-9-105(l)(1). In this case the only document that
could be a security agreement is the lease• Therefore, that lease
must be reviewed to determine whether it meets all the requirements
of a security agreement under Article 9.3
The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the "creates or provides
for" terminology of Utah Code § 70A-9-105 as requiring "language
specifically

granting

a

security

interest

in

collateral."

Pontchartrain State Bank, 684 F.2d at 706.
There is no language in the Butters-Jackson lease which comes
close to satisfying the requirements of Article 9 for the creation
of a security interest. The words "grants," "security interest" or
"security agreement" do not appear anywhere in the lease.

The

reason for this is simple: the parties never intended to create an
Article 9 security agreement.

If the parties did not so intend,

the court should not create such an agreement by supplying missing

3

The Tenth Circuit has noted that traditionally a security
agreement is contained in a separate security instrument. However,
some courts have construed other documents, such as promissory
notes or financing statements, as security agreements if they
otherwise satisfy the requirements of Article 9 and contain
language creating or providing for a security interest.
(Citations omitted).
Pontchartrain State Bank v. Poulson, 684 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir.
1982).
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ft,t least In the property that the tenants owned d/L * :Ainception of the lease. The problem of an apparent grant of a
security interest in as yet unacquired items, in violation r>f i-h*»
UCC, is discussed later in this section.

9

The designation of the collateral as "furniture, fixtures and
personal property" is not a sufficient description for Article 9
purposes.

Utah Code § 70A-9-110 provides:

For the purposes of this chapter any description of
personal property or, except as otherwise required by
Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-402 relating to the
contents of a financing statement, real estate is
sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably
identifies what is described.
By its own terms this definition precludes an argument that the
term "personal property" is a sufficient description of collateral.
By using the phrase "any description of personal property" as the
opening premise of Section 9-110, the drafters of Article 9 were
declaring that personal property must be described in a security
agreement.

Otherwise, the section is illogical.

There is virtually uniform agreement in the case law that the
term "personal property" is insufficient for describing collateral
in a security agreement.

In In re Boogie Enterprises, Inc.. 866

F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989) the court reviewed whether a
reference to "personal property" in a financing statement5 was
5

A financing statement is used to perfect a security
interest created by a security agreement. Utah Code § 70A-9-302.
A financing statement is sufficient if, among other things, it
"contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral." Utah Code § 70A-9-402(l) . As discussed in
First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Montana, 721 P.2d
1270, 1273 (Mont. 1986), the written description of collateral
serves different purposes in the security agreement and the
financing statement.

10

sufficient to perfect a security interest in settlement proceeds.
The court held that it did not, concluding:
The weight of authority indicates that financing
statements under the Uniform Commercial Code must
describe collateral with greater precision than that
furnished by the term "personal property."
A number of other courts have reached the same conclusion: See, In
re Fucrua, 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972) (the phrase "all
personal property" was insufficient to perfect a security interest
in livestock, feed, and farming equipment); In re H.L. Bennett, 588
F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1978) (the phrase "all assets as contained in
the security agreement" was too vague to satisfy §9-402); Lehigh
Press, Inc. v. National Bank of Georgia, 389 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. App.
1989)(the phrase "all personal property" failed to indicate the
types or describe the items of collateral in which a security
interest was taken); Becker v. Bank of Barron, 53 B.R. 450 (W.D.
Wise. 1985)(the phrase "all farm personal property" approached the
"super-generic" and did not reasonably identify the collateral);
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Halberstadt, 425 N.W. 2d 429 (la. App.
1988).

Because of the differing purposes, it is generally agreed that
the description of collateral requirement for security agreements
is stricter than for financing statements. Landen v. PCA of
Midlands. 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Woodward, 675 P.2d
1007, 1010 (N.M. App. 1983)("Because the security agreement
identifies the items of collateral, greater particularity is
required than in the financing statement.").
11

The In re Boogie court concluded:
We agree with the analysis of those courts and of
Professor Gilmore. Section 70A-9-402's requirement of
identification by "types" or "items" obliges the drafter
of a financing statement to designate the collateral for
a loan with greater specificity than the language
"personal property" provides.
"Personal property"
encompasses
all of the items—including
general
intangibles, among others—covered by the division of the
Code regulating secured transactions.
(Citation
omitted) . The term refers to essentially everything that
a creditor can perfect an interest in pursuant to the
Code.
"Personal property" cannot satisfy § 9402 's
requirement of identification of assets by "types" or
"items" because "personal property" refers to no more and
no less than every kind of collateral perfectible under
the statute.
If the language "personal property" were sufficient
to perfect a security interest, creditors would never
need to use any other language to designate collateral.
(Emphasis in the original).
In re Boogie Enterprises, 866 F.2d at 1174-75.

Given their

different purposesf and the generally more lenient approach to
language describing

collateral

in a financing

statement, the

court's condemnation of the term "personal property" supports a
fortiori the rejection of "personal property" as a sufficient term
for describing collateral in a security agreement.
Related to the issue of a sufficient description of the
collateral under § 9-203 is the issue of after-acquired property.
Article 9 permits the parties to secure an obligation by afteracquired collateral but that agreement must be stated in the
agreement.

Utah Code § 70A-9-204. In this case, there is no such

statement in the lease, yet the trial court, and the Court of
12

Appeals, allowed the landlord to seize and hold all property in
possession of the tenants at the end of the lease, without any
concern about whether some or all of the property allegedly pledged
to secure the rent was even present or in the possession of the
tenants at the outset of the lease.
It should be clear that questions about what property was
after-acquired cannot be answered, because the language which the
court found to create a security interest is simply too broad and
nondescriptive.
acceptance

of

Certiorari
lease

terms

should

be

"furniture,

granted
fixtures

because
and

the

personal

property" as satisfying § 9-203 plays havoc with well-established
principles of law developed under Article 9 and gives a blank check
to landlords which could be easily abused to the detriment of
innocent tenants.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY DECLARING A SECURITY INTEREST
WAS CREATED BY THE BUTTERS-JACKSON LEASE, ENFORCED AN
UNCONSCIONABLE LEASE TERM.
The UCC at Utah Code §70A-2-302 prohibits unconscionable terms
in

a

contract.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

unconscionability includes the absence of a meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.
v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983).
13

Bekins Bar V Ranch

The tenants signed the landlords' lease during a severe
housing shortage.

At the time in question, there was a severe

shortage of available housing in the Ogden, Weber County area. The
tenants had no choice regarding what terms would be included in the
lease because of the tight housing market and the form contract
that was provided.

The subject paragraph was just another of a

typical boiler-plate, closely printed lease agreement that favored
the owner. For example, the lease was for nine months and 21 days,
yet the owner, in addition to holding the tenants' personal
property for nonpayment of rent or other charges, could terminate
the lease, for any reason, " . . . with 10 days written
notice . . . ."
To claim that the tenants had a meaningful choice in signing
a lease that contained the subject clause during a tight housing
market is to strip Bekins Bar V of its intended meaning.

Jackson

had no meaningful choice when she affixed her signature on the
Butters lease.

The subject clause contained in the lease should,

therefore, be declared unconscionable.

Certiorari

should be

granted because the Court of Appeals has enforced an unconscionable
lease term and has therefore sanctioned an unconscionable result.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ENFORCING AN UNINTENDED SECURITY
AGREEMENT IN THE LEASE, WHICH ALLOWS THE SEIZURE OF
HOUSEHOLD GOODS, VIOLATES IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY
OBJECTIVES.

14

In P.H. v, Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991), the court
allowed waiver of the implied warranty of habitability only with a
separate signed disclosure, requiring an express waiver for public
policy reasons.

The same should be true here.

Before a tenant

gives up rights to personal property, including exempt property, it
seems reasonable that such waiver be express, clear, separately
signed,

if not barred altogether.

Here there is simply no

indication that such a waiver was intended at all, yet the Court of
Appeals enforced it, allowing landlord to seize and hold all of
tenants' property, solely based on the "contractual lien."

This

would seem to violate the public policy set forth in P.H. v.
Oliver.
Another indicator of the "wrong road" the Court of Appeals
decision leads to is found in the regulations of the Federal Trade
Commission.

The FTC's Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit

Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4), prohibits non-possessory, nonpurchase money security interests in consumers' household goods.
This regulation declares it an unfair act or practice for a lender
or retail seller directly or indirectly to take or receive from a
consumer an obligation that:
constitutes or contains a nonpossessory security interest
in household goods other than a purchase money security
interest.

15

Household goods includes: "clothing, furniture, appliances,
one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware,
and personal effects (including wedding rings) of the consumer and
his or her dependents . . ."16 C.F.R. § 444.l(i).

These are

exactly the kind of items that were seized and held with the lower
court's blessing here.

While the FTC Rule applies to finance

companies, credit unions, retailers
directly apply to landlords.

and others, it does not

The policy objectives it set out to

achieve are directly impacted here, however.

As one treatise put

While the collateral has little economic value as
collateral, the FTC has found that the threat of
repossession . . . of such goods provides creditors with
a powerful psychological lever. In fact, the FTC claimed
in the early 1980's that threats of repossession of
household goods security may have been the single most
common form of creditor harassment.
. . . The FTC has found that these threats cause great
emotional suffering, anxiety, guilt and distress, leading
to illness and strain on family relations. . . .
National Consumer Law Center, Repossessions and Foreclosures
(3d ed. 1995), at 100.

The public policy should lead to a

prohibition or strict reading of similar clauses in Utah leases,
not the blanket approval the Court of Appeals gave such clauses in
its initial opinion.

16

CONCLUSION
By finding a contractual lien and an unintended security
interest, the Court of Appeals departed both from recognized UCC
law and Utah public policy concerning leases. In addition to
resolving an issue that has great public importance in residential
leases and providing a seeming end-run around a relatively new
statute, these issues were not briefed or argued.

Certiorari

should be granted to argue these issues. While a valid intentional
security agreement and contractual lien may be included in a lease,
the Court of Appeals broad, sweeping approval of the vague and
unintended clause here will result in frequent seizures of tenants'
property, increased litigation around such clauses and seizures,
failure to follow the eviction statute and a bad public policy
which could extend to UCC cases.

Certiorari should be granted to

fully develop and resolve these issues.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3^S day of
1996.

J„ fy

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

MARTIN S. BfAUSTfilN
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that mailed (2) copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS to: C. E. BUTTERS
OR BETTY BUTTERS, Pro se Plaintiffs/Appellees, 1255 E. 2925 N.,
North Ogden, Utah 84414 on this ?.vS day of
s/^fy
1996.

MARTIN S. BLAUSTEIN
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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A P P E N D I X

la«i ?fi !0 .- AH:::
ORDER* OF RESTITUTION

C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS
1255 E 2 9 2 5 N

NORTH OGDEN UTAH 84414

.> ,A . . • — • —

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
ORDER OF
RESTITUTION

PLAINTIFF (OWNER) C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS

CASE NO.
VS
940008531 CV
)
)

DEFENDANTS (TENANTS) TINA JACKSON AND KELLY NORTON)
830 24TH
OGDEN UTAH
MOTION
THE OWNER AND PLAINTIFF WENT TO TRIAL. OWNER HAS BEEN GRANTED
JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S NAMED ABOVE. THE OWNER'S RIGHT
TO IMMEDIATE RESTITUTION OF THE PREMISES AND POSSESSION OF
DEFENDANT(S) PROPERTY AT THE PREMISES WAS FOUND.
DATED THIS

/<*

DAY OF

~Tj>.rJL>

1995

Sw'fe ''
ORDER OF RESTITUTION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1 ) THAT POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AT LISTED FOR THE DEFENDANT
NAMED ABOVE (830 24TH ST) BE DELIVERED TO THE OWNER, AND THAT THE
RENTER(S), AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY EROM THE
RENTER(S) BE REMOVED FROM THESE PREMISES.
D^€^<^^~
2) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT ALL-SEN52Si S) ' PERSONAL
PROPERTY BE LEFT AT THE PREMISES.
3) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT THE THREE DAY WAITING
PERIOD IS HEREBY WAIVED.
THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO EXECUTE THIS ORDER OF RESTITUTION IMMEDIATELY.
DATED THIS

c2D

DAY

1995

APPENDIX 1

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Martin S. Blaustein, #3993
Attorney for Defendants
550 - 24th Street, Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-9431
(WATS) 1-800-662-2538
(FAX) (801) 394-9434
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTER BUTTERS, *
*
Plaintiff,
*

AMENDED ORDER

*

v.

*

TINA JACKSON and
KELLY NORTON,

*
*

Judge: Pamela G. Heffernan

*

Defendants.

*

Civil No. 94-CV-853J

A hearing was held before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on
Defendants' Motion for Immediate Hearing on January 27, 1995 at the
hour of 9:00 a.m.

The Defendants appeared in person and was

represented by counsel, Martin S. Blaustein. The Plaintiff did not
appear in person, nor was represented by counsel.

Defendants'

counsel mailed a copy of the motion on January 23, 1995.

The

Plaintiff, according to the clerk of the court, called from Idaho,
claiming he did not receive the motion until January 26, 1995.
The court having heard the Defendants' concern amends the
prior order as follows:

0!8
APPENDIX 2

C.E, Butters v. Jackson, et al<
Amended Order
Civil No- 94-CV-853

J

O R D E R

1.

"'V'7

4io?H>i

-*r0:c-,..

The children's prescriptive medication shall be promptly

returned to Defendants•
2.

The children's clothing, shall be promptly returned.

This shall include the children's bedding, blankets, pillows and
sheets.
3.

The children's

promptly returned.

school books and materials

shall be

This includes all materials related to the

children's education.
4.

The Defendants or Defendants' counsel shall communicate

directory with the Plaintiff

regarding

a reasonable time to

transfer the above property. The Plaintiff shall supervise and be
present during this process.
5.

All other aspects of the prior order shall remain the

same.
DATED this

day of

PABELA/P'. HEFFERNAN
Circuix Cdurt Judge
Date entered:

019

C.E. Butters v. Jackson, et al.
Amended Order
Civil No. 94-CV-853
/«.. ?•
w

Mi

wv.

CERTIFICATE OF -MAILING
- •* . ' ^ *

I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER
was mailed, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, t h i s ^ r!
day of January 1995, to the following:
*
C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, Pro se
Plaintiff
1255 E. 2925 N.
North Ogden, UT 784414

Secretary
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IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

C.E.

BUTTERS,
D E C I S I O N

Plaintiff(s),
vs.
TINA JACKSON a n d
KELLY NORTON,

Case No.: 94 CV 8531
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan
Defendant(s),

The Court finds that the acceptance of partial payments in
October, 1994 by Plaintiff was not an act inconsistent with his
effort to evict the Defendant. The Court takes into account
specifically that Defendant has not paid any rent from that time
and had to be evicted involuntarily from the premesis as late as
January 1995.
Plaintiff shall submit a judgment as prayed for in the
complaint for back rent, court costs, and treble damages from the
date Defendant was served with the 3-Day Notice.
DATED this ^Z-TZT d a Y

of

Februarys

/PAMELA^. HEFFERN&N
/circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Decision, postage prepaid, to:
C.E. Butters
Plaintiff
1255 E 2925 N
N Ogden, UT 844 04,
dated this

Martin Blaustien
Attorney for Defendant
550 24th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

day of February, la

023

IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS,
D E C I S I O N
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
TINA JACKSON & KELLY NORTON,

Case No.: 95 CV 8531
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan

Defendant(s),
The Court has previously ruled that the contract provisions
regarding Defendant's property shall apply in the event of a
default on the contract, as is the case.
All previous orders shall remain in effect and Defendant's
Motion for Relief from Judgment is denied^—^
DATED this

CL'f

day of April, 1995.—>> /

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Decision, postage prepaid, to:
C.E & BETTY BUTTERS
Plaintiff's
1255 E 2925 N
N Ogden, UT 844 04
dated this

2

MARTIN BLAUSTEIN
Attorney for Defendant
550 24th Street, Suite 300
Ogden, UT 84401

day of April, 1995.

Depiut^

N

05urf

Clerk

APPENDIX 4

Codc«Co
Provo, Utah

Butters v. Jackson
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3. The Kearls had also argued to the trial court and on
appeal that an issue of material fact existed regarding
the location of the twenty-five-foot strip, but conceded
in oral argument that its location is undisputed.
4. Bowen may appear to be distinguishable from the
case at bar because plaintiffs predecessors in interest
in Bowen had originally obtained a tax title to the land
from the county. See Bowen v. Olson, 268 P.2d 983,
983 (Utah 1954). However, that fact is peripheral to
the court's opinion in Bowen, which focused solely on
plaintiffs adverse possession theory and specifically
dealt with the tax requirement of §78-12-12-the very
same statute involved here. See id. at 984-86. The
court's analysis did not even mention the original tax
sale to plaintiffs predecessors in 1943, but addressed
only whether plaintiffs redemption of the land from
a preliminary tax sale to the county in 1947 or 1948
constituted paying taxes for adverse possession
purposes under §78-12-12. Id.
5. We are not particularly impressed with this
analysis. Although, technically, redemption and
payment of taxes are not the same thing, practically
speaking, redemption from the preliminary sale to the
county is nothing more than a late payment. The
Bowen court seems to have placed inordinate
importance on this wordplay. Also, as we discuss
beginning in the next paragraph, the court's policy
reason for this rule is questionable, especially in this
case. However, because the operative facts of Bowen
are on-point with the operative facts of this case, we
must apply its rule.
The policy underlying the Bowen rule was stated by
the court as follows:
[B]y paying taxes on the land a public record is
made which gives notice to the owner that his
land is being claimed adversely. This purpose
cannot be fulfilled if the possessor can wait any
number of years, even up to the necessary seven,
and then pay the taxes in one lump sum by
redeeming. Under such circumstances the owner
would get no current notice of adverse claims
against his property, and may not until it is too
late to do anything about it.
Bowen, 268 P.2d at 985.
This notice policy is not entirely compelling for two
reasons. First, specific to this case, because the Kearls
were not listed as owners on county records and thus
were not assessed taxes on either the twenty-five-foot
strip or the New Hope Property, they would not have
received notice of adverse claims through payment of
property taxes by Johnson. Second, generally, those
purporting to own land—in this case, the Kearls-are
already "on notice" that they should be paying
property taxes to maintain their ownership of that
land. They should know that if they are not properly
paying property taxes and are not in possession of the
land someone else—the county or an adverse
possessor—could be laying claim to their land.
Although the latter reason may seem to cut against the
Kearls' claim to the twenty-five-foot strip, it is stated
only as an example of the weakness of notice as a
policy basis for requiring timely payment of taxes by
the adverse claimant during the entire seven-year
adverse possession period. However, as we observe in
footnote six, we are more concerned with the strength
of the Martins' claim, not the weakness of the Kearls'
claim. Also, other elements of adverse possession are
more likely to serve the purpose of giving notice in
any case.
Two other more sound policy bases for the rule
may be stated as follows: First, because of the gravity

of adverse possession claims-wresting title from
otherwise rightful owners-claimants must strictly
comply with all requirements. See 10 George W.
Thompson, Thompson on Real Property §87.01, at
81-82 (David A. Thomas ed. 1994); Edward L.
Montgomery, The Adverse Possession of Land Titles
in Utah, 3 Utah L. Rev. 294, 310 (1953); 2 C.J.S.
Adverse Possession §5 (1972). This compliance
includes timely payment of "all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to law,"
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12 (1992). And, second, the
tax payment requirement should not reward "one who
claims the benefits of ownership without fulfilling his
obligation to the community of [timely] paying taxes."
7 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on
Real Property 1 1013[2], at 91-68 (1996).
6. The Martins contend that, because the Kearls did
not notify the county that the parcel was severed into
two segments so that the county could separately
assess the twenty-five-foot strip and because the
Kearls made no attempt to pay the taxes themselves,
the Kearls are somehow at fault and foreclosed from
defending this adverse possession action. However,
"[p]laintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own
claim and not alone on the weakness of the
defendants' claims in order to succeed." Lyman v.
National Mortgage Bond Corp., 7 Utah 2d 123, 127,
320 P.2d 322, 325 (1958). The Kearls failure to show
they occupied the twenty-five-foot strip or paid taxes
on it does not "bar their rights to recover the property
where . . . plaintiffs have failed to establish any valid
claim or right to the property in themselves," id.
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BENCH, Judge:
Defendants (tenants) entered into a written
agreement with plaintiffs (landlords) to lease
residential real property. Tenants contend the
trial court erred by upholding certain provisions
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of their lease contract in violation of several
statutes. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
After serving tenants with a three-day notice
to quit or pay rent, landlords filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against tenants, alleging
nonpayment of rent. A bench trial was held and
the trial court awarded landlords a judgment for
back rent, court costs, and treble damages. The
order of restitution restored landlords to their
property and ordered tenants removed from the
premises. The trial court also ordered tenants to
leave their personal property on the premises as
required by the lease.
Tenants moved for an immediate hearing,
challenging the court's order as it pertained to
their personal property. At that hearing, the
court issued an amended order allowing the
tenants to retrieve their children's prescription
medicines, clothing, bedding, and educational
materials. All other aspects of the court's
original order were upheld.
Tenants then moved for relief from judgment
pursuant to rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The motion alleged that the
trial court's order violated the foliowmg
statutory provisions: the order of restitution
statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10.5 (Supp.
1995); the lessors' lien statute, Utah Code Ann.
§38-3-1 and -4 (1994); and the exempt property
statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§78-23-5, -8, and -11
(1992). Tenants appeal from the denial of their
rule 60(b) motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The denial of a motion to vacate a judgment
pursuant to rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only
for an abuse of discretion. Department of Social
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah
1989).
ANALYSIS
Tenants argue that the order of restitution
issued by the trial court improperly denied them
the opportunity to remove their personal
property from the leased premises. Further,
tenants assert that the trial court improperly
allowed landlords to retain tenants' personal
property without obtaining a writ of attachment
and bond. Tenants also allege that at least pan
of the property retained by landlords was
property exempt from execution.
Restitution under Unlawful Detainer
Utah Code Annotated
§78-36-10.5(1)
provides: "Each order of restitution shall (a)
direct the defendant 10 vacate the premises,
remove his personal property, and restore
possession of the premises to the plaintiff." The
order of restitution issued by the trial court in
this case required that "all defendant[s'] personal
property be left at the premises." Tenants
therefore claim the trial court's order of
restitution is contrary to the statute.

Code^Co
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In the instant case, the order of restitution
statute must be read in conjunction with
provisions creating lessors' liens. See Jerz v.
Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah
1991) (holding that potentially conflicting
legislative acts are to be construed in harmony
with each other and to avoid conflicts).
A lessors' lien can be created by statute. Utah
Code Ann. §38-3-1 (1994) ("Whenever any rent
shall be due and unpaid under a lease, or the
lessee is about to remove his property from the
leased premises, the lessor may have the
personal property of the lessee which is upon the
leased premises and subject to such lien attached
without other ground for such attachment."). 1 A
lessors' lien can also be created by contract.
Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329
(Utah 1977) (validating lease term granting
landlord contractual lien against tenant's
personal property which was to remain on
premises until rent paid). Therefore, although
the order of restitution statute envisions the
return of personal property to the tenant, it does
not preclude the creation and enforcement of a
lessors' lien. To hold otherwise would allow the
order of restitution statute to destroy or nullify
the effect of an otherwise valid lessors' lien.
Statutory and Contractual Liens
As mentioned, a landlord may obtain an
interest in a tenant's personal property through
either a statutory lessors* lien or a lease
contract. The lessors' lien statute provides that
a landlord "shall have a lien for rent due upon
all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or
kept upon the leased premises." Utah Code Ann.
§38-3-1 (1994). Section 38-3-4 provides that
before a landlord may obtain a writ of
attachment for the property, the landlord must
file a complaint, with an accompanying affidavit
and bond. See id. §38-3-4. Tenants claim
landlords retained their property without
complying with section 38-3-4.
However, the statutory lessors' hen, as
provided in sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-8, is
separate and distinct from a lien created by
contract. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg. ,N.V.9 663
P.2d 56, 57-60 (Utah 1983) (analyzing claims of
both statutory lien and contractual lien on
tenants' personal property); Robert
S.
Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and
Tenant §6.23, at 441-42 (1980) (lessors'
contractual lien "exists independently of the
right of distress or a lien conferred by statute");
5 Thompson on Real Property 31 (David A.
Thomas ed. 1994) ("When not prohibited by
statute, a consensual lien in favor of the landlord
may exist independently of distraint or statutory
lien rights.")
To establish a contractual lien, the contract
must: "(1) identify the property to be charged,
and (2) make clear that the lien is to secure
payment of the debt in question." Citizens Bank,
663 P.2d at 59. In Citizens Bank, the Utah
Supreme Court considered, in detail, the
requirements for a contractual lien. A lease
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providing that "any unpaid rent would be a lien
against the lessee's personal property, which
was not to be removed until all rent was paid,"
was determined to meet the criteria of a
contractual lien. Id. (citing Frisco Joes, 558
P.2d at 1329-30). In Citizens Bank, the lease
provided that the landlord could "reenter the
premises . . . and take possession of the same
and all equipment and fixtures therein, and
thereafter relet the premises or any part thereof
for the account of the tenant." Id. This did not
meet the criteria for a contractual lien because it
did not "state that its purpose is for securing
rent, nor does it in any way suggest that a
charge is created against lessee's property from
which rent may be collected." Id. at 60.
By comparison, the lease in the instant case
expressly provides: "Furniture, fixtures and
personal property of tenant may not be removed
from the premises until rent or other charges are
fully paid." The lease satisfies the first prong of
the Citizens Bank test by identifying the tenants'
furniture, fixtures, and personal property as the
property to be charged. The lease also satisfies
the second prong of the test by providing that
the described property is to secure payment of
the rent in that it "may not be removed from the
premises until rent or other charges are fully
paid." This language is very similar to that
found in the contractual lien upheld in Frisco
Joes. Therefore, the lease agreement in the
instant case created a contractual lien.
Because the contractual lien is separate and
distinct from the statutory lessors' lien, the
lessor need not follow the unique requirements
for enforcing a statutory lien. Further, a
contractual lien is a security interest under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Schoshinski, supra, §6.23, at 443 ("The
landlord's contractual lien is generally
considered a chattel mortgage, and as such is a
'security interest' under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. ").2 Landlords in the
instant case properly enforced their security
interest in tenants' personal property as part of
the unlawful detainer action.

property is enforceable. Thus, because we have
determined that the lease created a security
interest in landlords' favor, and because a
security interest in exempt property is
enforceable, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying tenants' motion to vacate
the judgment under rule 60(b).
CONCLUSION
The lease in this case created a contractual
lien in the tenants' exempt and nonexempt
personal property. The lien was a security
interest and its enforcement in the unlawful
detainer action was proper. The trial court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying
tenants' motion for relief from judgment under
rule 60(b). Affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
1. The statutory lessors' lien would allow the
breaching tenant to remove exempt property, but the
nonexempt property would be subject to the lien. Utah
Code Ann. §38-3-1(1994).
2. Utah has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
Utah Code Ann. §70A-9- 104(b) (1990) provides that
landlord's liens are excluded from article nine.
However, in other jurisdictions, UCC 9-104(b) has
been interpreted as excluding only statutory lessors'
liens. Schoshinski, supra, §6.23, at 443 n.37. We
conclude that a contractual lessors' lien is covered by
article nine.
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Exempt Property
Tenants next assert that landlords should not
have been allowed to retain property exempt
from execution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. No. 950033-CA
§§78-23-5 and -8. Tenants further contend that FILED: May 16, 1996
the exemptions may not be waived pursuant to
section 78-23-11.
Third District, Salt Lake County
Section 78-23-11 prohibits the waiver of The Honorable Robert L. Newey
exemptions in favor of unsecured creditors. A
landlord who is a secured creditor by virtue of ATTORNEYS:
a contractual lien does not fit that category. See Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt
Utah Code Ann. §78-23-2(8) (1992) ("'Security
Lake City, for Appellant
interest' means an interest in property created by Jan Graham and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake
contract to secure payment or performance of an
City, for Appellee
obligation."); WellbroBldg. Co. v. McConnico,
All P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1966) (holding Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings.
contractual lien in lease creates security
interest). Utah Code Ann. §78-23-10(2) (1992)
provides that a security interest in exempt
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